Controller overload a factor in the Comair crash?
Additional details are coming out about the Comair crash as the NTSB continues its investigation. The ultimate cause of the crash is a simple one: the aircraft needed about 1500 feet more runway to develop sufficient flight speed than she had. By the time the crew ran out of runway, there was no chance whatsoever for the aircraft to take flight. It is, regrettably, that simple. The question isn’t what made the plane crash, it’s why did the pilot get on the wrong runway to begin with?
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) shows that the pilots noticed something wrong with the runway they’d turned onto. It had no lights, which should have been a dead giveaway that something wasn’t right. Neither pilot notified the tower of the discrepancy.
Coming to light now is the fact that the controller in the tower was up there by himself. At the crucial moment, the controller had to turn away from the field and handle a traffic count, an administrative duty. According to the FAA, the controller was performing both tower operations and radar approach ops. That’s a workload in violation of the FAA’s own directive, issued in November of 2005, which is something that someone at the FAA better have an explanation for.
Also playing a factor was a recently completed repaving project that changed the active taxiway configuration. The lack of familiarity with those changes might have confused the pilots.
Comment from Gordie
Time September 6, 2006 at 03:00
Its time to stop the insanity. It was not the controller’s fault. Many commuter airline flights operate to/from airports without control towers, let alone controllers. Many times you can’t even see the end of the runway from a control tower because of buildings or other obstacles. Many times airports operate when fog or other weather phenomena prevent the controller from seeing any part of the runway. In every one of these cases, as in the recent Kentucky accident, it is (and always be) the pilot’s responsibility to taxi out to and on the correct runway, and take off on the correct runway once cleared. No amount of smoke screen will change that basic fact.
Someone else in the aviation industry commented that “if only they had the newest technology, Gadget-XYZ123 that will prevent this from happening”. Another smoke screen. The aircraft is airworthy with the equipment it has. It is up to the pilot(s) to use the equipment they have and the equipment in their head to keep such things from happening. If we decide that all such decisions should be left up to tower controllers and/or the newest technology gadgets, then we can get rid of pilots all together. It would save lots of money, and we would have one less union to strike and disrupt the airline operation.
As to the weight of the plane, many recent hind-sighters have said that these planes are “always overloaded”, and they have to remove passengers sometimes to get the weight right. They assume this means a design flaw or operational error of some kind, but in reality this is absolutely true IN EVERY SINGLE PLANE THAT FLYS. Whether you have a Cessna 150, or a Boeing 747. The climb performance, planned flight time, required fuel for holding or weather, location of the cargo/passengers, and a myriad of other factors must be calculated FOR EVERY FLIGHT ON EVERY AIRPLANE, EVERY DAY, commercial or private.
Are there “contributing factors”? Perhaps. But whether the plane was a Cessna or a Comair, or an American Airlines jet, with or without a computer, GPS, audible warning system or anything else, it is and always will be the pilot’s responsibility to make sure he/she is on the correct runway, and their instruments confirm that before they release their brakes and start the take-off roll.